“The failure to appropriately adjust the patent system to accommodate the competitive circumstances created when patents are incorporated into standards undermines the purposes of the standard-setting enterprise and impairs the utility and proliferation of standardized technologies. Without a course correction among the judiciary, the United States risks finding itself as a less desirable jurisdiction for pro-growth and pro-competitive patenting and standard-setting activities.”

Abstract: A consensus at the intersection of patent and anti-trust law was achieved after a series of decisions finding that in some circumstances owners of standard essential patents (SEPs) have an antitrust duty to deal with willing licensees. Beginning in 2017, however, the Department of Justice derailed U.S. policy by undermining the role and usefulness of antitrust for policing abuses of the standard setting process. This article traces the emergence of the consensus, its abrogation by the DOJ, and the resulting effects and prospects for the future.